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I. INTRODUCTION 
In February 2011, newly elected Governor of Wisconsin, Scott 
Walker, introduced his Budget Repair Plan, a draconian set of 
measures designed to strip most public-sector workers in the state 
of the power to bargain collectively over the terms and conditions 
of their employment.1  That act touched off weeks of unrest at the 
state capitol, culminating in a 100,000 person protest.2  Democratic 
legislators fled the state, hoping to prevent the quorum needed in 
the legislature to pass the bill.3  The measure eventually passed, but 
much of it remains tied up in litigation.4  Meanwhile, angry voters 
recalled the governor—only the third time in U.S. history the 
voters of a state have recalled a governor5—but Walker, backed by 




 1.  Bill Glauber, Dave Umhoefer & Lee Bergquist, Budget Confrontation 
Rocked the State—and Beyond, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 4, 2011, http:// 
www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/123172373.html.  
 2.  James B. Kelleher, Up to 100,000 Protest Wisconsin Law Curbing Unions, 
REUTERS, Mar. 12, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/13 
/usa-wisconsin-idUSN1227540420110313. 
 3.  Glauber et al., supra note 1. 
 4.  Steven Greenhouse, County Judge Strikes Down Some Restrictions on Public 
Unions in Wisconsin Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012 
/09/15/us/judge-strikes-parts-of-wisconsin-union-law.html.  
 5.  Recall of State Officials, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org 
/legislatures-elections/elections/recall-of-state-officials.aspx (last visited Jan. 18, 
2013).  In 1921, Lynn Frazier of North Dakota was the first governor to be 
recalled; a dispute over state-owned industries led to his downfall.  North Dakota 
Gubernatorial Recall Election, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North                   
_Dakota_gubernatorial_recall_election (last updated June 21, 2012, 6:59 PM).  In 
2003, California voters recalled Governor Gray Davis amid that state’s energy and 
budget crises.  California Gubernatorial Recall Election, WIKIPEDIA, http://en 
.wikipedia.org/wiki/California_gubernatorial_recall_election (last updated Nov. 
25, 2012, 10:17 PM). 
 6.  David Horsey, Billionaires Buy Wisconsin Recall Election for Scott Walker, L.A. 
TIMES, June 7, 2012, http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/topoftheticket/la-na  
-tt-billionaires-buy-wisconsin-20120606,0,7775507.story.  Two-thirds of the $31 
million Walker raised to beat back the recall effort came from out-of-state donors; 
Walker outspent his challenger by 7-to-1.  Id. 
2
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The pitched battle over public-sector union rights in 
Wisconsin was but one lightning strike in a storm that has been 
brewing across the United States.  Since the 1990s, and intensifying 
sharply in the last five years, public employees and their unions 
have endured a pummeling from state legislatures, governors, 
pundits—and even the U.S. Supreme Court.  While lawmakers 
around the country are rescinding collective bargaining rights for 
many public workers, the Court has issued a series of opinions that 
make it increasingly difficult for public-sector workers and their 
unions to engage in political activity—and to stand up to those 
attacks on their very existence.  Most recently, in Knox v. Service 
Employees International Union Local 1000,7 the Court seized upon an 
opportunity presented by a narrow administrative question to 
impose new and unprecedented limitations upon the political 
speech of public-sector workers’ unions. 
This note begins with a brief history of unionism in the public 
sector in the United States, including the competing ideologies 
undergirding the debate over public-sector union rights.  It 
describes the recent backlash against public-sector workers and 
their unions, providing the context within which the Supreme 
Court’s recent decisions are situated.  Then, it traces the 
development of the Court’s public-sector labor jurisprudence 
through five key cases dealing with public-sector unions’ political 
activity, ending with the 2012 case Knox v. Service Employees 
International Union Local 1000.  Knox, I argue, portends a grim 
future for public-sector unionism in the United States. 
II. HISTORY OF PUBLIC-SECTOR UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. Origins and Growth of Public-Sector Unions 
While organized craft unions in the private sector date back to 
the mid-nineteenth century,8 major federal legislation granting 
workers the right to organize and bargain collectively left out 
public employees.9  As a result, public-sector unionism was “virtually 
 
 7.  132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012). 
 8.  See generally RICHARD O. BOYER & HERBERT M. MORAIS, LABOR’S UNTOLD 
STORY (1955); PRISCILLA MUROLO & A.B. CHITTY, FROM THE FOLKS WHO BROUGHT 
YOU THE WEEKEND (2001).   
 9.  The 1935 National Labor Relations Act (also known as the Wagner Act), 
which granted private-sector workers the right to form unions and bargain 
collectively with their employers, explicitly excluded public employers from its 
3
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nonexistent”10 in the United States until the 1960s.11  In 1962, 
however, President Kennedy signed Executive Order 10988, which 
established union recognition procedures and granted limited 
collective bargaining rights for federal employees in the executive 
branch.12  Executive Order 10988 was hailed “as the Magna Carta 
for federal-employee unionism.”13  States followed the federal 
government’s lead; the order accelerated the passage of state 
legislation granting public employers at the state and local levels 
the authority to bargain with associations of public employees.14  By 
1980, forty-two states had authorized collective bargaining for at 
least some categories of public employees.15 
Unionization among public employees grew exponentially in 
the 1960s and 1970s.  Between 1956 and 1978 membership in 
public-sector unions increased 500 percent.16  By 1978, almost 40 
percent of all public employees were represented by unions.17  The 
 
coverage.  See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006) (“The term ‘employer’ includes any 
person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not 
include the United States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any 
Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof . . . .”); see also 
Donald S. Wasserman, Collective Bargaining Rights in the Public Sector: Promises and 
Reality, in JUSTICE ON THE JOB: PERSPECTIVES ON THE EROSION OF COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES 57 (Richard N. Block et al. eds., 2006).   
 10.  Wasserman, supra note 9, at 57. 
 11.  Small groups of public workers had organized as early as the 1800s when 
craftsmen employed in Navy shipyards joined unions.  E. EDWARD HERMAN & 
ALFRED KUHN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR RELATIONS 85 (1981).  In the 
early 1900s, workers from the Government Printing Office and Postal Service 
unionized, though these unions “functioned primarily as fraternal, social, craft, or 
benevolent organizations.”  Id. at 85–86. 
 12.  Wasserman, supra note 9, at 58. 
 13.  HERMAN & KUHN, supra note 11, at 86. 
 14.  Id. at 87.  Many states patterned their collective bargaining statutes 
closely after the federal law governing private-sector labor relations.  The state laws 
“mimicked the federal National Labor Relations Act so well that many have called 
them ‘mini-Wagner Acts.’”  Richard B. Freeman, What Can We Learn From the NLRA 
to Create Labor Law for the Twenty-First Century?, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 327, 333 
(2011).  
 15.  HERMAN & KUHN, supra note 11, at 87 (“Thus, by 1980, 38 states and the 
District of Columbia had collective bargaining statutes covering all or some 
categories of public employees.  In addition, in Arkansas and Virginia, attorney 
general opinions authorize collective bargaining; in Illinois, state employees may 
bargain under a 1973 executive order issued by the governor; in New Mexico, the 
state personnel board has issued regulations authorizing collective bargaining.”). 
 16.  HAROLD W. DAVEY, MARIO F. BOGNANNO & DAVID L. ESTENSON, 
CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 371 (1982). 
 17.  Id. at 373.  There are a number of reasons for this explosion in public-
sector unionism.  First, “[p]ublic sector employment more than doubled between 
1956 and 1978.”  Id.  Other reasons include:  
4
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explosive growth of unionization in the public sector, however, 
parallels a concurrent decline in private-sector unionization rates.  
While the percentage of wage and salary workers in unions peaked 
at 34.8% in 1954,18 overall union membership is now holding 
steady at about 11.3%,19 with the public-sector union membership 
rate (35.9%) more than five times higher than that of private-sector 
workers (6.6%).20 
B. Competing Ideologies 
The dramatic increase in public-sector unionization 
corresponded with growing acceptance of the legitimacy of public-
sector unions, followed by intense backlash since the 1990s,21 
demonstrated most vividly by the recent turmoil in Wisconsin.22  
This shift in acceptance of public-sector unionism reflects the 
evolution of competing paradigms of public-sector labor relations.  
The “traditional” ideological model of public-sector labor relations, 
 
(1) removal of restrictive legislation by means of executive orders and 
legislation at the federal level and collective bargaining statutes enacted 
by 38 states; (2) awareness of a disadvantageous economic shift between 
private and public employees; (3) acceptance of the institution of trade 
unionism by public sector employees much as it has been accepted by 
their private sector counterparts for several decades; (4) effectiveness of 
confrontation tactics, with many of labor relations’ direct pressure tactics 
modeled on those utilized by the civil rights movement in the early to 
mid-sixties; (5) breakdown in and loss of respect for many forms of 
authority; [and] (6) indifference of public agency officials to job-related 
complaints or grievances which, in turn, led to employee frustration and 
increasing receptiveness to union organizing attempts. 
HERMAN & KUHN, supra note 11, at 87, 89. 
 18.  GERALD MAYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32553, UNION MEMBERSHIP 
TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 12 (2004), available at http://digitalcommons 
.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1176&context=key_workplace.  Note 
also that virtually all of those union members in 1954 would have worked in the 
private sector, because very few public-sector workers had the right to organize at 
that time.  
 19.  News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members—2012 (Jan. 
23, 2013), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf.  
 20.  Id. 
 21.  See generally Neil Fox, PATCO and the Courts: Public Sector Labor Law as 
Ideology, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 245; Martin H. Malin, The Legislative Upheaval in Public-
Sector Labor Law: A Search for Common Elements, 27 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 149, 150–51 
(2012). 
 22.  After Governor Scott Walker proposed legislation in early 2011 that 
would have stripped most state workers of their collective bargaining rights, tens of 
thousands of people protested in the Wisconsin capitol for weeks.  See generally 
Todd A. DeMitchell & Martha Parker-Magagna, “A ‘Law’ Too Far?”  The Wisconsin 
Budget Repair Act: Point, 275 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2012). 
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which prevailed until the 1960s, is hostile to collective action by 
public workers.23  This model viewed unionism as “a threat to the 
state’s sovereignty and to the government’s responsibility to reflect 
popular will.”24  Under this model, a public-sector employer that 
bargains with a union “gives up some of its power to decide public 
matters, and to this extent, illegally delegates its power.”25 
In contrast, a “new”26 model of public-sector labor relations 
developed in the 1960s that mirrored the industrial pluralism 
framework dominant in the private sector at that time.27  This 
 
 23.  Fox, supra note 21, at 259. 
 24.  Id.  See generally Joseph E. Slater, The Court Does Not Know “What a Labor 
Union Is”: How State Structures and Judicial (Mis)constructions Deformed Public Sector 
Labor Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 981 (2000). 
 25.  Fox, supra note 21, at 259; see also Malin, supra note 21, at 153.  Malin 
points out other common criticisms of public-sector collective bargaining, which 
include (1) that bargaining distorts democracy by giving unions access to 
decisionmakers that no other group enjoys; (2) that bargaining is not conducted 
at arm’s length because the government officials want the union’s support in the 
next election; and (3) that such bargaining leads to “bloated salaries and benefits, 
excessive staffing levels, inefficient work rules, job security for poor performers, 
the absence of merit in employment decisions, and the stifling of innovation in 
the delivery of public services.”  Id. 
 26.  Note that Fox described this “new” ideology in 1985, shortly after the 
1981 nationwide strike of air traffic controllers, which effectively ended when 
President Reagan fired them all.  Fox, supra note 21, at 261.  Reagan’s sacking of 
the air traffic controllers is widely recognized as a turning point in both public- 
and private-sector labor relations in the United States.  See Joseph A. McCartin, 
Unexpected Convergence: Values, Assumptions, and the Right to Strike in Public and Private 
Sectors, 1945–2005, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 727, 728 (2009) (“Once Reagan permanently 
replaced the striking members of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers 
Organization (PATCO) and showed that the public would support such an action, 
a number of prominent private sector employers followed suit.  In the 1980s, 
Phelps-Dodge, Greyhound, International Paper, Hormel, and others imitated 
Reagan’s example.  The results were disastrous for labor.”).  While Fox’s 
characterization of this model of labor relations as “new” was apt in 1985, before 
the effects of Reagan’s actions were fully felt, it is no longer new, and it appears to 
be in decline. 
 27.  See Fox, supra note 21, at 255.  Following the Great Depression, the labor 
unrest that accompanied it, and the subsequent enactment of the Wagner Act, 
which recognized private-sector workers’ rights to form unions and bargain with 
their employers, a new labor relations regime developed.  “Industrial pluralism,” 
as it was called,  
reject[ed] the widespread hostility towards labor unionism that was 
evident throughout judicial opinions from the early nineteenth century 
until the 1930s.  Instead of viewing unions as coercive restraints of trade 
or as illegal criminal conspiracies, the industrial pluralists accept[ed], 
indeed favor[ed], the growth of labor unions as a healthy sign of 
capitalist economic development.   
Id.  Although the industrial pluralism framework enjoyed several decades as the 
6
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model “acknowledge[d] that labor’s interests are legitimate, and 
recognize[d] and protect[ed] workers’ rights to organize.”28  It 
regarded collective bargaining as “a therapeutic way for labor and 
management to resolve differences as equals.”29  Statutory schemes 
that were enacted under this paradigm required public employers 
to negotiate with their employees over the terms and conditions of 
their employment. 
Professor Clyde Summers,30 in a series of articles, articulated 
the practical and theoretical underpinnings of this “new” 
paradigm.31  Throughout these articles, Professor Summers 
emphasizes two key points.  First, there are fundamental 
differences between collective bargaining in the private sector and 
collective bargaining in the public sector.  Most importantly, 
bargaining in the private sector is essentially an economic, market-
driven exercise, while bargaining in the public sector is a legislative 
act.32  A negotiated contract in the public sector “is an instrument 
of government and a product of government decision making” with 
direct implications for the level of taxes the public will pay, while 
private-sector bargaining solely concerns the interests of the two 
parties across the table, with “little or no concern for the interest or 
welfare of the public.”33 
Second, a built-in bias in our political system requires 
collective bargaining for public workers.34  The political nature of 
governmental decision making around terms and conditions of 
public employment is not a reason to deny employees the right to 
 
dominant ideological model of private-sector labor relations, it has waned in 
recent decades.  Id. at 256. 
 28.  Id. at 262. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Professor Summers, according to one writer, was to union democracy law 
what Louis Brandeis was to the field of privacy law.  Michael J. Goldberg, Present at 
the Creation: Clyde W. Summers and the Field of Union Democracy Law, 14 EMP. RTS. & 
EMP. POL’Y J. 121, 121 (2010). 
 31.  See Clyde W. Summers, Bargaining in the Government’s Business: Principles 
and Politics, 18 U. TOL. L. REV. 265 (1987) [hereinafter Summers, Bargaining in the 
Government’s Business]; Clyde W. Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political 
Perspective, 83 YALE L.J. 1156 (1974) [hereinafter Summers, A Political Perspective]; 
Clyde W. Summers, Public Sector Bargaining: A Different Animal, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & 
EMP. L. 441 (2003) [hereinafter Summers, A Different Animal]; Clyde W. Summers, 
Public Sector Bargaining: Problems of Governmental Decisionmaking, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 
669 (1975) [hereinafter Summers, Problems of Governmental Decisionmaking].  
 32.  Summers, Bargaining in the Government’s Business, supra note 31, at 266. 
 33.  Summers, A Different Animal, supra note 31, at 442. 
 34.  Summers, Bargaining in the Government’s Business, supra note 31, at 268. 
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bargain collectively.  On the contrary, because government 
employees are massively outnumbered by voters, who continually 
demand more public services at a lower cost, public employees 
need to speak with one voice through a union in order to offset this 
political disadvantage.35 
C. Backlash 
Summers’s views and the “new” model of public-sector labor 
relations enjoyed predominance through the 1980s.  Since the 
1990s, however, a fierce backlash against public-sector unions has 
been brewing in state legislatures and the courts.36  Over the past 
five years in particular, public workers have endured a vicious and 
unprecedented attack37 not only on their wages and benefits, but 
also on their right to bargain over the terms and conditions of their 
employment.38  The economic downturn that began in 2007 
provided a convenient opportunity for right-wing politicians to pin 
governments’ fiscal woes on so-called “pampered public sector 
employees with high wages and benefits and high job security.”39 
While the connection between collective bargaining rights and 
massive budget deficits is, at best, misguided and, at worst, sheer 
pretext for union busting,40 states from New Jersey to Idaho have 
nevertheless recently enacted laws restricting collective bargaining 
rights for public employees.41  Common themes among these laws 
 
 35.  Id.; see also Summers, A Political Perspective, supra note 31, at 1161 (“[T]he 
fact that the economic interests of the voting public, both as taxpayers and as users 
of public services, run directly counter to the economic interests of public 
employees in wages and working conditions suggests that public employees may 
need special procedures to insure that their interests receive adequate 
consideration in the political process.”). 
 36.  Malin, supra note 21, at 150–51.  Despite a brief period of expansion of 
public-employee-union rights in the early 2000s, the overall trend since the 1990s 
has been a marked contraction of those rights.  Id. at 151–52. 
 37.  Joseph E. Slater, Public-Sector Labor in the Age of Obama, 87 IND. L.J. 189, 
189 (2012). 
 38.  Kenneth Glenn Dau-Schmidt & Winston Lin, The Great Recession, the 
Resulting Budget Shortfalls, the 2010 Elections and the Attack on Public Sector Collective 
Bargaining in the United States, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 407, 411 (2012). 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  See Slater, supra note 37, at 202 (“[N]o significant correlation between 
public-sector bargaining rights and state deficit levels has been shown. . . .  [S]tates 
that allow public-sector collective bargaining on average have a 14% deficit relative 
to their budgets, while states that bar collective bargaining have 16.5% deficits.”). 
 41.  See generally Malin, supra note 21.  Malin’s analysis focuses on legislative 
changes in twelve states.  The National Conference of State Legislatures, which 
tracks bills related to collective bargaining, found that there were 820 bills 
8
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are: (1) limiting the scope of bargaining, most frequently taking 
the topic of health insurance off the table;42 (2) changing impasse 
resolution procedures to give public employers greater control over 
the terms of employment;43 (3) giving governments the right to 
renegotiate or rescind collective-bargaining agreements in times of 
financial distress;44 and (4) repealing the right to bargain 
altogether.45  Taken together, these changes may represent “the 
largest grab for economic and political power by the American 
upper class since the destruction of the labor guilds in the 1890s 
and the rise of the ‘Gilded Age’ in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century.”46 
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S EVOLVING VIEW ON                            
PUBLIC-EMPLOYEE UNIONS 
A. Speech: The Key Issue 
A key battleground in the fight over public-sector union rights, 
and the focus of this note, is the right of unions to collect and 
spend money for political purposes, particularly when 
 
introduced in all fifty states and Puerto Rico in 2011 seeking to restrict or 
eliminate collective bargaining rights of public workers.  David Schaper, Collective 
Bargaining Curbs Spread Across the U.S., NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 24, 2011, 3:27 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/2011/05/24/136610879/collective-bargaining-curbs-spread   
-across-the-u-s; see also R. Theodore Clark, Jr., Public Sector Collective Bargaining at the 
Crossroads, 44 URB. LAW 185, 188 (2012) (“[I]n light of recent developments that 
do not augur well for public sector collective bargaining, future labor scholars may 
well look back on the last 50 years as ‘The Golden Age of Public Sector Collective 
Bargaining.’ . . .  While legislative enactments and the results of collective 
bargaining have unquestionably favored public sector labor unions in the past half 
century, there are significant signs that the tide is beginning to turn.”).  For a 
database of all public-employee-related bills introduced in 2011 and 2012, see 
Collective Bargaining Legislation Database, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www 
.ncsl.org/issues-research/labor/collective-bargaining-legislation-database.aspx. 
 42.  Malin, supra note 21, at 157 (“By far, the most numerous changes made 
in the upheaval of 2011 concerned the scope of bargaining.”). 
 43.  Id. at 160.  Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Jersey, and Wisconsin amended impasse-resolution procedures.  Id. at 160–63. 
 44.  Id. at 163.  Nevada and Michigan enacted “financial distress” provisions.  
Id. at 163–64. 
 45.  Id. at 154.  Oklahoma and Tennessee repealed statutes that granted 
public employees the right to bargain with their employers.  Wisconsin effectively 
ended collective bargaining for all public workers except law enforcement, 
firefighters, and transit workers (if the denial of collective bargaining to transit 
workers would result in the loss of federal transit money).  Id. at 156. 
 46.  Dau-Schmidt & Lin, supra note 38, at 408. 
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nonmembers47 object to such payments.  This question raises First 
Amendment issues because payment of union dues is, in many 
states, a condition of government employment.  Mandatory dues 
that are used for political speech represent a form of compelled 
speech and present troubling First Amendment issues, with which 
the Supreme Court has been wrestling for decades.48 
The Court’s jurisprudence in this area reflects the changing 
public sentiment regarding public-sector unions.  Its cases, starting 
with Abood v. Detroit Board of Education49 in 1977 (in which the Court 
approved of public-sector unionism generally and of agency-shop 
agreements specifically) and ending most recently with Knox v. 
Service Employees International Union Local 100050 (in which the Court 
repudiated key precedent on its way toward forcing “right-to-work” 
arrangements on all public employees), mirror the predominant 
thinking of their times.  While Abood is representative of the “new” 
model of public-sector labor relations prevalent at its time, Knox 
plainly reflects the anti-union backlash of recent years.  An 
examination of the key public-sector union dues cases leading up 
to Knox shows this disturbing evolution in the Court’s 
jurisprudence. 
B. International Association of Machinists v. Street: The 
Foundational Case from the Private Sector 
While not related to public-sector workers, the case 
International Association of Machinists v. Street51 forms the basis for 
much of the Court’s jurisprudence on public-sector-union matters.  
 
 47.  A “nonmember” is a person who is covered by a union contract but is not 
a full member of the union.  The nonmember receives all the benefits of the 
collective-bargaining agreement and union representation but may not participate 
in the internal decision-making process of the union, such as electing officers and 
ratifying contracts.  In so-called “right-to-work” states, nonmembers may not be 
compelled to contribute anything toward the cost of representation and collective 
bargaining.  In other states, the nonmember pays an “agency fee” or “fair share 
fee” to cover the union’s costs related to bargaining and representation.  See infra 
note 109. 
 48.  See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233–34 (1977) (“Our 
decisions establish with unmistakable clarity that the freedom of an individual to 
associate for the purpose of advancing beliefs and ideas is protected by the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments. . . .  Equally clear is the proposition that a 
government may not require an individual to relinquish rights guaranteed him by 
the First Amendment as a condition of public employment.” (citations omitted)). 
 49.  431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
 50.  132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012). 
 51.  367 U.S. 740 (1961). 
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In Street, a group of railroad workers objected to their union’s 
collection and expenditure of dues money for political purposes.  
Without reaching the objecting members’ constitutional 
arguments, the Supreme Court nevertheless held that Congress, 
through the Railway Labor Act, had not given unions the right to 
collect money for political uses over the objection of members who 
disagreed with the unions’ views.52 
Although the objecting members were entitled to some 
remedy for the union’s improper collection of their dues for 
political expenditures, the Supreme Court declined to fashion a 
specific remedy for those workers.  In instructions for the lower 
court on remand, however, the Court established guidelines for the 
remedy that should be applied.  Noting that the majority of 
members also had an interest in speaking on political matters 
without being silenced by the minority of dissenters, the Court 
urged lower courts to “select remedies which protect both interests 
to the maximum extent possible without undue impingement of 
one on the other.”53  Any such remedy, however, “would properly 
be granted only to employees who have made known to the union 
officials that they do not desire their funds to be used for political 
causes to which they object.”54  The Court emphasized that “dissent 
is not to be presumed—it must affirmatively be made known to the 
union by the dissenting employee.”55  By placing the burden of 
objection upon the dissenting employee, the rights of both that 
employee and the majority who wish to engage in political speech 
are protected to the greatest degree possible.56 
This holding, that dissent is not to be presumed, surfaced in 
the Court’s subsequent decisions on public-sector unions’ speech 
rights, beginning with Abood in 1977 and ending with Knox in 2012.  
While the early cases affirm Street’s holding, Knox leaves an open 
question as to whether Street is still good law. 
C. Abood v. Detroit Board of Education: Birth of the Agency Shop for 
Public-Sector Unions 
The first Supreme Court case to deal with public-sector 
unions’ ability to collect dues for political expenditures was the 
 
 52.  Id. at 750. 
 53.  Id. at 773. 
 54.  Id. at 774. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  See id. at 773–74.   
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1977 case Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,57 in which the Court 
unanimously approved of agency-shop58 arrangements for public-
employee unions.59  After the State of Michigan enacted legislation 
authorizing local units of government to bargain with unions 
representing their employees, a group of teachers filed suit to 
challenge the law.60 
The teachers argued, first, that public employment carries 
certain constitutional guarantees not present in private-sector 
employment, and second, that collective bargaining in the public 
sector is inherently political, and for that reason it would violate 
public employees’ rights under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments to require them to financially support a union for any 
purpose.61 
The Supreme Court rejected both arguments.  First, the Court 
borrowed the “familiar doctrine[]”62 from federal labor law, that 
labor peace is best achieved through the principle of exclusive 
representation.63  Exclusive representation, the Court noted, carries 
many benefits. 
The designation of a single representative avoids the 
confusion that would result from attempting to enforce 
two or more agreements specifying different terms and 
conditions of employment.  It prevents inter-union 
rivalries from creating dissension within the work force 
 
 57.  431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
 58.  See generally Robert C. Cloud, Commentary, Davenport v. Washington 
Education Ass’n: Agency Shop & First Amendment Revisited, 224 EDUC. L. REP. 617, 
619–20 (2007) (“[An agency shop is] one in which a union acts as an agent for all 
employees, regardless of their union membership.  In an agency shop, employees 
are not required to join the union, but nonmembers do benefit from the union’s 
collective bargaining efforts as much as those who are members.  Consequently, 
agency shop agreements entitle unions to levy service or ‘agency’ fees on 
nonmembers.  The primary purpose of such agreements is to prevent 
nonmembers from freeloading on the union’s collective bargaining efforts 
without sharing the costs incurred in the process.” (citations omitted)). 
 59.  The Court in Abood relied heavily upon Street, 367 U.S. 740.  See supra Part 
III.B.  
 60.  Abood, 431 U.S. at 211–14. 
 61.  Id. at 226–27. 
 62.  Id. at 220. 
 63.  Id. at 220–21.  In the private sector, Congress established the principle of 
exclusive representation in the National Labor Relations Act.  See 29 U.S.C. 
§ 159(a) (2006)  (“Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of 
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for 
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such 
unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, 
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment . . . .”). 
12
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and eliminating the advantages to the employee of 
collectivization.  It also frees the employer from the 
possibility of facing conflicting demands from different 
unions, and permits the employer and a single union to 
reach agreements and settlements that are not subject to 
attack from rival labor organizations.64 
Although Congress left the regulation of state and local 
government labor relations to the states, the Court reasoned that, 
compared to the private sector, “[t]he desirability of labor peace is 
no less important in the public sector.”65  Exclusive representation 
does not violate the First Amendment rights of public employees 
because they remain free to engage in the political process on their 
own terms as well.66  “[T]he principle of exclusivity cannot 
constitutionally be used to muzzle a public employee who, like any 
other citizen, might wish to express his view about governmental 
decisions concerning labor relations.”67  Therefore, states may 
adopt the principle of exclusive union representation to achieve 
the important governmental interest of labor peace, and public 
 
 64.  Abood, 431 U.S. at 220–21; see also Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition 
Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 63 (1975) (“National labor policy has been built on the 
premise that by pooling their economic strength and acting through a labor 
organization freely chosen by the majority, the employees of an appropriate unit 
have the most effective means of bargaining for improvements in wages, hours, 
and working conditions.  The policy therefore extinguishes the individual 
employee’s power to order his own relations with his employer and creates a 
power vested in the chosen representative to act in the interests of all employees.  
‘Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining representative with powers 
comparable to those possessed by a legislative body both to create and restrict the 
rights of those whom it represents . . . .’”) (quoting NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. 
Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967)); Summers, Bargaining in the Government’s Business, 
supra note 31, at 269 (“The principle of exclusive representation is considered 
fundamental in our labor law.  It approaches being the First Commandment with 
the deification of the majority union . . . .  But it is not written on stone from Sinai; 
it has more practical origins.  The historical purpose of exclusive representation 
was to prevent an employer from playing one union against another to divide and 
conquer, and its practical purpose was to establish a single contract with 
standardized terms.”). 
 65.  Abood, 431 U.S. at 224. 
 66.  Id. at 230 (“A public employee who believes that a union representing 
him is urging a course that is unwise as a matter of public policy is not barred from 
expressing his viewpoint.  Besides voting in accordance with his convictions, every 
public employee is largely free to express his views, in public or private orally or in 
writing.  With some exceptions not pertinent here, public employees are free to 
participate in the full range of political activities open to other citizens.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 67.  Id. at 230 (citing City of Madison, Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Emp’t 
Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167, 174 (1976)). 
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employees may be compelled to help pay for the cost of that 
representation.68 
Requiring public employees to financially support a union’s 
political and ideological activities, however, is a different story.  The 
Court stated: 
Our decisions establish with unmistakable clarity that the 
freedom of an individual to associate for the purpose of 
advancing beliefs and ideas is protected by the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  Equally clear is the proposition 
that a government may not require an individual to 
relinquish rights guaranteed him by the First Amendment 
as a condition of public employment.69 
To require employees, as a condition of public employment, to 
support particular political causes and candidates would 
impermissibly infringe upon their rights under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments, for “[i]f there is any fixed star in our 
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, 
or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or 
act their faith therein.”70  Therefore, a union may “constitutionally 
spend funds for the expression of political views, on behalf of 
political candidates, or toward the advancement of other 
ideological causes not germane to its duties as collective-bargaining 
representative” so long as those expenditures are not financed by 
employees who object to advancing those ideas.71  In other words, 
the Court divides union expenditures into two categories: 
chargeable (those expenses incurred in the course of the union’s 
duties to act as the exclusive collective bargaining agent for all 
employees) and nonchargeable (those expenses not “germane” to 
collective bargaining but spent “for the expression of political 
views, on behalf of political candidates, or toward the advancement 
of other ideological causes”).72  Unions may require nonmembers 
to contribute toward the chargeable expenses, but not toward the 
nonchargeable ones.73 
As for how to draw the line between chargeable and 
 
 68.  Id. at 225–26. 
 69.  Id. at 233–34 (citations omitted). 
 70.  Id. at 235 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 
642 (1943)). 
 71.  Id. at 235–36. 
 72.  Id. at 235. 
 73.  See id. 
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nonchargeable expenses, the Court found the record in Abood too 
thin to justify rulemaking on that issue, and it left that question for 
another day.74 
D. Chicago Teachers Union Local No. 1 v. Hudson: Procedural 
Safeguards for First Amendment Rights 
The Court tackled the division of chargeable and 
nonchargeable expenses in 1986 with the case Chicago Teachers 
Union Local No. 1 v. Hudson.75  In that case, the Illinois General 
Assembly in 1981 amended the school code to permit agency shop 
agreements in union contracts.76  The following year, the Chicago 
Teachers Union and Chicago Board of Education entered into an 
agreement that permitted the union to collect “proportionate 
share payments” from nonmembers,77 which amounted to ninety-
five percent of regular union dues.78  The union identified its 
expenditures unrelated to collective bargaining based on its 
financial records for the previous fiscal year.79  The union also 
established a procedure by which nonmembers could lodge 
objections to its calculations.80 
Four nonmembers objected to the proportionate share 
deduction, bypassing the union’s internal objection process and 
challenging the new procedure in court.81  They raised three 
objections to the union’s procedure: first, “it violated their First 
Amendment rights to freedom of expression and association; 
[second,] it violated their . . . due process rights [under the 
Fourteenth Amendment]; and [third,] it permitted the use of their 
proportionate share[] for impermissible purposes.”82  On appeal, 
however, the nonmembers focused their attack on the procedures 
used to calculate the amount of the proportionate share fee.83 
 
 74.  See id. 
 75.  475 U.S. 292 (1986). 
 76.  Id. at 294–95.  Prior to the amendment, union member teachers bore all 
the expenses of collective bargaining and contract administration, while 
nonmember teachers received the benefits of that representation without 
contributing to the cost.  Id. at 294. 
 77.  Id. at 295. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. at 296. 
 81.  Id. at 297. 
 82.  Id. at 297–98. 
 83.  Id. at 299. 
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In its decision in Hudson, the Supreme Court recalled its 
statement in Abood that “the objective must be to devise a way of 
preventing compulsory subsidization of ideological activity by 
employees who object thereto without restricting the Union’s 
ability to require every employee to contribute to the cost of 
collective-bargaining activities.”84  “Procedural safeguards are 
necessary to achieve this objective for two reasons.”85  First, while 
the governmental interest in labor peace justifies the limited 
intrusion on First Amendment rights that comes with the agency 
shop, “the fact that those rights are protected by the First 
Amendment requires that the procedure be carefully tailored to 
minimize the infringement.”86  Second, the nonmember who 
objects to the political expenditures “must have a fair opportunity 
to identify the impact of the governmental action on his interests 
and to assert a meritorious First Amendment claim.”87  Therefore, 
the Court held, 
[T]he constitutional requirements for the Union’s 
collection of agency fees include an adequate explanation 
of the basis for the fee, a reasonably prompt opportunity 
to challenge the amount of the fee before an impartial 
decision maker, and an escrow for the amounts 
reasonably in dispute while such challenges are pending.88 
So, while Abood approved of the agency shop in public employment 
and distinguished between chargeable and nonchargeable 
expenses, Hudson established procedural safeguards for 
nonmember employees who object to supporting the union’s 
political and ideological program. 
E. Davenport v. Washington Education Association: Cracks in              
the Foundation 
For twenty years, Hudson provided a workable framework 
under which unions could collect and spend funds for political 
activity from willing members while affording objecting 
nonmembers an opportunity to opt out of those expenditures.  In 
the 2007 case Davenport v. Washington Education Association,89 
 
 84.  Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 237 (1977). 
 85.  Hudson, 475 U.S. at 303.   
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. at 310. 
 89.  551 U.S. 177 (2007). 
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however, the Court started to chip at the foundation it had laid 
with Abood and Hudson, a foundation that, consistent with the 
requirements of Street, delicately balanced the right of the union to 
collect money for political speech with the First Amendment rights 
of dissenting nonmembers. 
In Davenport, voters in the State of Washington had approved a 
comprehensive campaign finance reform law, which included a 
provision prohibiting unions from using nonmembers’ dues and 
fees for political expenditures unless the nonmember affirmatively 
approved of that contribution.90  Several nonmembers and the 
State of Washington separately brought suit against the union, 
claiming that the union was using nonmembers’ agency fees for 
political purposes without their affirmative consent, in violation of 
the law.91 
The Washington Supreme Court held that the law was 
unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tailored to minimize 
the impact on union members’ right to expressive activity while 
protecting the rights of dissenting nonmembers.92  The U.S. 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that “given the unique context of 
public-sector agency-shop arrangements, the content-based nature 
of [the law] does not violate the First Amendment” for three 
reasons.93 
First, the Court explained that the Washington Supreme Court 
had interpreted the Court’s past cases on agency fees too broadly.94  
Those cases do not call for a balancing of the rights of dissenting 
members against the rights of members, the Court explained, “for 
the simple reason that unions have no constitutional entitlement to 
 
 90.  WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.760 (2006) (“A labor organization may not use 
agency shop fees paid by an individual who is not a member of the organization to 
make contributions or expenditures to influence an election or to operate a 
political committee, unless affirmatively authorized by the individual.”) 
(recodified at WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17A.500 (2012)). 
 91.  Davenport, 551 U.S. at 183. 
 92.  State ex rel. Wash. State Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 
130 P.3d 352, 362–63 (Wash. 2006) (“We conclude that the union’s expressive 
activity is significantly burdened by [the] opt-in requirement.  We also conclude 
that any compelling state interest in protecting dissenters’ rights, could be met by 
less restrictive means other than the . . . opt-in procedure.  The union’s Hudson 
procedures amount to a constitutionally permissible alternative that adequately 
protects both the union and dissenters.  Because [the law] is not narrowly tailored, 
we hold that the statute is unconstitutional.”). 
 93.  Davenport, 551 U.S. at 190. 
 94.  Id. at 185. 
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the fees of nonmember-employees.”95  The procedure for 
protecting nonmembers’ rights as set out in Hudson is a floor, not a 
ceiling.  If a state wishes to require more than Hudson requires, it is 
free to do so without triggering First Amendment scrutiny.96 
Second, even though the opt-in law was ostensibly part of a 
package of campaign finance laws, the Court’s campaign finance 
decisions were not on point.97  The union argued that the law was 
unconstitutional because it imposed restrictions on how a union 
may raise and spend funds that are lawfully within its possession.  
The Court disagreed, noting: 
For purposes of the First Amendment, it is entirely 
immaterial that [Washington’s law] restricts a union’s use 
of funds only after those funds are already within the 
union’s lawful possession . . . .  What matters is that public-
sector agency fees are in the union’s possession only 
because Washington and its union-contracting 
government agencies have compelled their employees to 
pay those fees. . . .  As applied to public-sector unions, 
[the law] is not fairly described as a restriction on how the 
union can spend “its” money; it is a condition placed 
upon the union’s extraordinary state entitlement to 
acquire and spend other people’s money.98 
Finally, the Court rejected the union’s argument that the law 
represented an impermissible content-based restriction on speech, 
since it required affirmative consent for expenditures for political 
speech but not for other kinds of speech.  Conceding that content-
based restrictions on speech are presumptively invalid,99 the Court 
nonetheless noted that the risk that government will use content-
based restrictions to interfere with the marketplace of ideas is not 
present here.100  The Washington law was a “reasonable, viewpoint-
neutral limitation on the State’s general authorization allowing 
public-sector unions to acquire and spend the money of 
 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id.; cf. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 237 (1977) (“[T]he 
objective must be to devise a way of preventing compulsory subsidization of 
ideological activity by employees who object thereto without restricting the 
Union's ability to require every employee to contribute to the cost of collective-
bargaining activities.”). 
 97.  Davenport, 551 U.S. at 187. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. at 188 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377 (1992)). 
 100.  Id. 
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government employees.”101  The law leaves unions free to 
participate in the marketplace of ideas with funds that were not 
raised from dissenting nonmembers.102 
What is remarkable about Davenport is not that the Supreme 
Court upheld a state’s regulation of its public-sector unions, but the 
way in which the Court began to describe public-sector labor 
relations.  Whereas Abood extolled the virtues of exclusive 
representation,103 the Court in Davenport came out swinging against 
public-sector unions.  After a brief description of the procedural 
history, the Court declared that “[r]egardless of one’s views as to 
the desirability of the agency-shop agreements, it is undeniably 
unusual for a government agency to give a private entity the power, 
in essence, to tax government employees.”104  This statement 
demonstrates a significant shift in the Court’s view of public-sector 
unions.105  While unions were once useful organizations that 
fostered the important goal of labor peace and helped public 
employees speak with one voice at the bargaining table,106 they were 
now, in the Court’s view, simply private entities that possess the 
“extraordinary” power to “tax” public employees.107 
F. Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association: A Sharp Right Turn 
Two years after Davenport, the Court upheld another state law 
regulating public-sector agency fees in Ysursa v. Pocatello Education 
Association.108  In that case, the State of Idaho, which is a “right-to-
work”109 state, enacted a law eliminating “checkoff”110 for voluntary 
 
 101.  Id. at 189. 
 102.  Id. at 190. 
 103.  See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 220, 224 (1977). 
 104.  Davenport, 551 U.S. at 184 (citations omitted). 
 105.  Note that the makeup of the Court changed almost entirely between 
Hudson and Davenport.  Justice Stevens is the only justice to hear both cases.  Chief 
Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, 
Rehnquist, Stevens, and O’Connor were replaced by Chief Justice Roberts, Scalia, 
Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito.  The Davenport court 
contained all the current members of the right-wing bloc on the Court.   
 106.  See Abood, 431 U.S. at 228 (“Through exercise of their political influence 
as part of the electorate, the [public] employees have the opportunity to affect the 
decisions of government representatives who sit on the other side of the 
bargaining table.”). 
 107.  Davenport, 551 U.S. at 184. 
 108.  555 U.S. 353 (2009). 
 109.  “Right-to-work” is a term for state laws that forbid union security 
agreements, or agreements which require membership in a union as a condition 
of employment.  The Taft-Hartley Act permits states to enact such laws for private-
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contributions to fund unions’ political activities.111  The law, which 
provided criminal sanctions for violations, applied to private 
employers as well as to the state and political subdivisions of the 
state.112 
Unions representing both private-sector and public-sector 
employees challenged the law, claiming that it violated the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments.113  The unions argued that the ban 
on checkoffs for political activities was an impermissible content-
based restriction on speech because the law banned checkoffs for 
expenses to support political speech but not for any other category 
of speech.114 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held the law 
unconstitutional as it applied to the State as an employer.115  
Applying strict scrutiny, the appellate court held that the law was an 
impermissible regulation of content-based speech for which the 
State asserted no compelling justification.116 
 
sector workers.  See 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (2006).  Some states similarly forbid union 
security agreements for public-sector workers.  In “right-to-work” states, union 
members bear all the costs of collective bargaining and contract administration, 
even though all workers who are covered by the contract benefit from the 
collective bargaining agreement.  Those who receive the benefits of union 
representation without paying for it are known as “free riders.”  See DAVEY ET AL., 
supra note 16, at 399. 
 110.  “Checkoff” is an agreement by which an employer deducts union dues 
and fees from employees’ wages and remits those amounts to the union.  HERMAN 
& KUHN, supra note 11, at 106.  Unions highly value checkoff agreements, as they 
save the union a great deal of time, effort, and money in its dues-collection duties.  
See id. 
 111.  Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 355–56. 
 112.  Id. at 356.  Violations of the law are punishable by a fine of up to $1000, 
ninety days of imprisonment, or both.  Id. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. at 358. 
 115.  Pocatello Educ. Ass’n v. Heideman, 504 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2007).  The 
district court held the law unconstitutional as applied to private employers and 
political subdivisions of the state.  Id. at 1056.  The State did not appeal the ruling 
as to private employers.  Id. 
 116.  Id. at 1056.  Before applying strict scrutiny analysis, the court of appeals 
examined whether forum analysis would be appropriate in this case.  Id. at 1059–
68.  Under a forum analysis, the State may draw content-based distinctions for 
speech that occurs on government property that is a nonpublic forum.  Id. at 
1059–60.  The appellants argued that forum analysis was appropriate because 
payroll deduction programs of local governments are nonpublic fora of the state.  
Id. at 1060.  The court rejected that argument, however, because the State “failed 
to establish that local governments’ payroll deduction programs involve Idaho’s 
discretion and control over the management of its own internal affairs, such that 
the programs should be considered a nonpublic forum of the State.”  Id. at 1067 
20
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The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed, holding that the 
State need not “affirmatively assist political speech by allowing 
public employers to administer payroll deductions for political 
activities.”117  Idaho’s law did not abridge the unions’ freedom of 
speech, according to the Court; it simply declined to use the state-
sponsored mechanism of the payroll deduction to promote the 
unions’ speech.118 
Because the State had not infringed the unions’ First 
Amendment rights, the Court applied rational basis review to the 
law.119  Relying on Davenport, in which the Court approved of 
content-based distinctions for union speech, it found that “the 
State’s interest in avoiding the reality or appearance of government 
favoritism or entanglement with partisan politics”120 was sufficient 
to justify the regulation, and that the ban on checkoff deductions 
“plainly serves the State’s interest in separating public employment 
from political activities.”121  Further, the State may regulate the 
payroll activities of local government units because those units are 
“subordinate governmental instrumentalities created by the State 
to assist in the carrying out of state governmental functions.”122  
The State’s interest in separating governmental functions from 
partisan politics “extends to all public employers at whatever level 
of government.”123 
The majority opinion in Ysursa drew several pointed dissenting 
opinions.  Justice Breyer took issue with the majority’s position that 
the statute did not interfere with the union’s rights under the First 
Amendment.124  Because a deduction system already existed, and 
the union was not seeking to create a new system to aid in the 
promotion of speech, the debate over whether the State’s action 
was “abridging” speech or simply “declining to promote” speech 
was “more metaphysical than practical.”125  Nevertheless, Justice 
Breyer would have found that there was a First Amendment right at 
stake, and that the State’s ban on checkoff for political speech 
 
(citation omitted).  Therefore, the law was unconstitutional as to the political 
subdivisions of the state.  Id. at 1068. 
 117.  Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 364. 
 118.  Id. at 355. 
 119.  Id. at 359. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. at 361. 
 122.  Id. at 362 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964)). 
 123.  Id. at 363. 
 124.  Id. at 365–66 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 125.  Id. at 366. 
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“affects speech, albeit indirectly, by restricting a channel through 
which speech-supporting finance might flow.”126 
Justice Breyer agreed with the majority that strict scrutiny was 
not the proper way to analyze this restriction on speech.127  Instead 
of using rational basis review, he would ask a question the Court 
has asked in other speech cases, namely “whether the statute 
imposes a burden upon speech that is disproportionate in light of 
the other interests the government seeks to achieve.”128  In line with 
those cases, he would find Idaho’s statute constitutional if he were 
convinced that the statute applied evenhandedly among similar 
kinds of contributions.129  But, because the law was so clearly 
targeted against labor unions, it is not clear that it is evenhanded: 
“A restriction that applies to the political activities of unions alone 
would seem unlikely to further the government’s justifying 
objective, namely providing the appearance of political 
neutrality.”130  As such, the speech-related harm is disproportionate 
to the government’s interest in maintaining the appearance of 
neutrality.131 
Justice Stevens, also dissenting, was more direct: “Because it is 
clear to me that the restriction [on checkoff deductions] was 
intended to make it more difficult for unions to finance political 
speech, I would hold it unconstitutional in all its applications.”132  
Justice Stevens identified two key features of the statute that belied 
its purported viewpoint neutrality.  First, the statutory context—the 
statute pertained solely to labor unions—suggests that the 
legislature intended specifically to hinder only unions’ ability to 
raise funds for political speech.133  Second, the law was both 
substantially overinclusive and underinclusive with respect to the 
State’s claimed interest in disavowing entanglement with politics;134 
it was overinclusive because it initially applied to private employers 
as well as public employers,135 and it was underinclusive because it 
failed to restrict payroll deductions for charitable purposes.136 
 
 126.  Id. at 367. 
 127.  Id. at 366–67. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. at 368. 
 130.  Id. at 369. 
 131.  Id. at 369–70. 
 132.  Id. at 370 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 133.  Id. at 371. 
 134.  Id. at 371–72. 
 135.  Id. at 372.   
 136.  Id. at 371–72. 
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Justice Souter similarly was troubled by the fact that “[u]nion 
speech, and nothing else, seems to have been on the legislative 
mind”137 when the State enacted the checkoff restriction.  A reader 
of the statute, he argued, “may fairly suspect that Idaho’s legislative 
object was not efficient, clean government, but that unions’ 
political viewpoints were its target, selected out of all the politics 
the State might filter from its public workplaces.”138  Still, because 
the unions did not directly raise the issue of viewpoint 
discrimination, the Court could not have fully explored that 
issue.139  A court decision that ignores that “elephant in the room” 
is one with limited authority.140  For that reason, Justice Souter 
argued, this case was a poor “vehicle to refine First Amendment 
doctrine.”141  He would not have granted certiorari in this case.142 
While the Court demonstrated in Davenport that it would 
uphold content-based state regulations of public-sector union 
speech, it showed in Ysursa just how far it was willing to go in order 
to do so.  Idaho’s law did not just ban the use of payroll deduction 
for checkoff for voluntary political contributions; it criminalized it.  
It did not just apply to the state, but to all the political subdivisions 
of the state.  And the Supreme Court upheld that unduly harsh and 
expansive law. 
G. Knox v. Service Employees International Union Local 1000: 
The Beginning of the End for Public-Sector Unions? 
1. Background and Procedure 
On June 13, 2005, then-Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger 
called for a special election to be held in November in which voters 
would consider, among other things, two proposed ballot measures 
that alarmed the union representing 95,000 public workers in 
California,143 Service Employees International Union (“SEIU”) 
Local 1000.  Proposition 75 “would have required unions to obtain 
employees’ affirmative consent before charging them fees to be 
 
 137.  Id. at 377 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. at 377–78. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. at 378. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  About Local 1000, SEIU LOCAL 1000, http://seiu1000.org/your-union 
/about.php (last visited Jan. 26, 2013). 
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used for political purposes.”144  Proposition 76 “would have limited 
state spending and would have given the Governor the ability 
under some circumstances to reduce state appropriations for 
public-employee compensation,”145 in effect giving the governor the 
power to unilaterally abrogate duly-negotiated and ratified 
contracts with the state’s public-employee unions. 
SEIU Local 1000 had already sent out its annual Hudson 
notice146 in early June 2005, before the Governor announced his 
plans.147  After the period for making Hudson objections expired, 
the union’s democratically-elected council148 instituted an 
“Emergency Temporary Assessment to Build a Political Fight-Back 
Fund,”149 which raised membership dues by one-quarter of one 
percent (0.25%), from 1.0% of gross wages to 1.25%.150  This dues 
increase was intended to raise money to defeat Propositions 75 and 
76 and to assist in the union’s political efforts in the 2006 general 
election.151 
After receiving the notice of the dues increase, one of the 
plaintiffs complained to the union that he had not been afforded 
an opportunity to object to the special assessment.152  With the help 
 
 144.  Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2285 (2012). 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  A Hudson notice is part of the procedural due process requirement 
under Chicago Teachers Union Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986).  This 
notice, which a public-sector union sends out to nonmembers, usually on an 
annual or semi-annual basis, explains its calculation of chargeable and 
nonchargeable expenses for the coming year and offers nonmembers an 
opportunity to challenge that calculation and/or opt out of (object to) paying the 
nonchargeable expenses.  Id. at 310.  An “objecting nonmember” is one who opts 
out of paying the nonchargeable expenses and pays only for the expenses 
germane to collective bargaining under Hudson.  See id. at 292. 
 147.  Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2285.  The Hudson notice explained that 56.35% of its 
total expenditures in the coming year would be devoted to chargeable collective 
bargaining activities and would constitute the fair share percentage of dues and 
fees that would be charged to nonmembers in the coming year.  Id. 
 148.  Brief for Respondent, Knox, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (No. 10-1121), 2011 WL 
5908951. 
 149.  Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2285. 
 150.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 148, at *3.  The union’s Hudson notice 
included a statement that the agency fee was subject to increase at any time 
without further notice.  Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2285. 
 151.  Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2285–86.  According to the union’s proposal, the 
Fight-Back Fund would be used “for a broad range of political expenses, including 
television and radio advertising, direct mail, voter registration, voter education, 
and get out the vote activities in our work sites and in our communities across 
California.”  Id. at 2286 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 152.  Id. at 2286. 
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of the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation,153 the 
plaintiff filed a class-action suit on behalf of 28,000 nonmember 
employees who contributed to the Fight-Back Fund, some who had 
objected after the regular Hudson notice was sent, and some who 
had never previously objected.154 
The district court granted summary judgment to the class of 
nonmembers,155 but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.156  
Applying Hudson’s balancing test—“devis[ing] a way of preventing 
compulsory subsidization of ideological activity by employees who 
object thereto without restricting the Union’s ability to require 
every employee to contribute to the cost of collective-bargaining 
activities”157—that court held that no second Hudson notice was 
necessary after the mid-year increase was instituted.158 
First, according to the court of appeals, the chargeable and 
nonchargeable dues calculations set out in Hudson notices, as a 
matter of “practical necessity,”159 lag one year behind actual 
expenditures.  Because Hudson requires that the union’s financial 
statements be audited before being presented to members and 
nonmembers, the union’s expenditures must have been made 
before the chargeable portion can be calculated.  “The audit 
requirement renders impossible any method of determining the 
chargeability of the upcoming fee year’s expenditures other than 
basing it on the prior year’s actual expenditures, because one 
cannot audit anticipated future expenditures.”160  The “inevitable 
effect”161 of such a requirement is that nonmembers’ fair-share fees 
will fluctuate from year to year based on the prior year’s 
expenditures, but “these over- and undercharges even out over 
time.”162 
 
 153.  Id. at 2284; see also Press Release, Nat’l Right to Work Legal Def. Found., 
Inc., Federal Judge Blocks Unlawful Union Dues Seizures from State Government 
Employees (Nov. 3, 2005), available at http://www.nrtw.org/en/press/2005/11 
/federal-judge-blocks-unlawful-union-dues-seizures-state-government-employees. 
 154.  Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2286; Brief for Petitioners, Knox, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (No. 
10-1121), 2011 WL 4100440 at *5. 
 155.  Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2286. 
 156.  See Knox v. Cal. State Emps. Ass’n Local 1000, 628 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
 157.  Id. at 1119–20 (quoting Chi. Teachers Union Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 
U.S. 302 (1986)). 
 158.  Id. at 1123.   
 159.  Id. at 1121. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Id. 
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Second, and related to the first point, unions’ chargeable and 
nonchargeable expenses vary from year to year.  A union might 
negotiate a significant new contract in one year (the costs of which 
would be attributable to collective bargaining expenses) and 
engage in election year politics the next (which would generate a 
great deal of nonchargeable expenses).  Thus, “Hudson’s prior year 
method assumes and accepts that a union has no ‘typical spending 
regime,’ and that even though spending might vary dramatically, a 
single annual notice based upon the prior year’s audited finances is 
constitutionally sufficient.”163  The union’s June 2005 Hudson 
notice, then, was sufficient for the current year because the 
temporary emergency dues increase would be accounted for in the 
next year’s Hudson notice. 
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit rejected the district court’s 
conclusion that it is incumbent upon the union to devise a system 
that imposes the least possible burden on objecting 
nonmembers.164  The union’s obligation, the court stated, is “to 
establish a system that merely ‘reasonably accommodates the 
legitimate interests of the union, the [public employer] and 
nonmember employees.’”165 
2. The Supreme Court Decision 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed, and 
remanded, holding that “when a public-sector union imposes a 
special assessment or dues increase, the union must provide a fresh 
Hudson notice and may not exact any funds from nonmembers 
without their affirmative consent.”166  In reaching that holding, the 
Court examined issues of compelled speech and whether the 
process for objecting properly protects nonmembers’ First 
 
 163.  Id. at 1122. 
 164.  Id. at 1122–23. 
 165.  Id. at 1123 (quoting Grunwald v. San Bernardino City Unified Sch. Dist., 
994 F.2d 1370, 1376 n.7 (9th Cir. 1993)); see also Andrews v. Educ. Ass’n of 
Cheshire, 829 F.2d 335, 340 (2d Cir. 1987) (“When the union’s plan satisfies the 
standards established by Hudson, the plan should be upheld even if its opponents 
can put forth some plausible alternative less restrictive of their right not to be 
coerced to contribute funds to support political activities that they do not wish to 
support.”). 
 166.  Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2296 (2012).  
Justice Alito, writing for the majority, was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.  Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor 
concurred in the judgment.  Justices Breyer and Kagan together dissented. 
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Amendment rights.167 
First, the Court explored the inherent tension between 
obligatory payment of union dues and the First Amendment.  
Beginning from the proposition that “[t]he government may not 
prohibit the dissemination of ideas that it disfavors, nor compel the 
endorsement of ideas that it approves,”168 the Court noted that 
union dues constitute a form of compelled speech, since payment 
of dues—or at least payment of agency fees—is a condition of 
employment for most public-sector workers.169  As such, union dues 
represent a “‘significant impingement on First Amendment 
rights’”170 because “a public-sector union takes many positions 
during collective bargaining that have powerful political and civic 
consequences,”171 positions with which nonmembers may disagree.  
The Court observed that “[o]ur cases to date have tolerated this 
‘impingement,’ and we do not revisit today whether the Court’s 
former cases have given adequate recognition to the critical First 
Amendment rights at stake.”172 
The Court then turned to the method by which objecting 
nonmembers must make their objections known.  By “historical 
accident,”173 according to the Court, an “opt-out” system developed, 
which requires nonmembers to declare affirmatively that they 
object to paying dues and fees to support the union’s political 
objectives; if they do not opt out, they are presumed to wish to 
support the political program.174  That approach, the Court said, 
“represents a remarkable boon for unions,”175 because it puts the 
burden of asserting First Amendment rights on the objecting 
nonmember.  “[W]hat is the justification for putting the burden on 
the nonmember to opt out of making such a payment [to fund a 
union’s political or ideological activities]?” the Court asked.176  
“Shouldn’t the default rule comport with the probable preferences 
 
 167.  Id. at 2293–96. 
 168.  Id. at 2288 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382 
(1992)). 
 169.  Id. at 2289. 
 170.  Id. (quoting Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 455 
(1984)). 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. at 2290. 
 174.  Id.; see Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 744 (1961); Abood 
v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 238–42 (1977). 
 175.  Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2290. 
 176.  Id. 
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of most nonmembers?”177  Finding no justification, the Court, for 
the first time, imposed an “opt-in” requirement for nonchargeable 
expenses, making a dues objection the default position unless the 
nonmember affirmatively opts in to paying such dues. 
Then, the Court explained why a fresh Hudson notice for mid-
year dues increases is necessary in order to protect the First 
Amendment rights of objecting nonmembers.  In short, “Hudson 
made it clear that any procedure for exacting fees from unwilling 
contributors must be ‘carefully tailored to minimize the 
infringement’ of free speech rights.”178  Informed choice is the key 
to the Hudson notice system, the Court explained.179  An annual 
notice is only sufficient if it provides the nonmember with all the 
information she needs in order to make a decision about whether 
to object for the year.  If the union makes a mid-year change in the 
amount of dues that it will require nonmembers to pay, the 
nonmembers could not have given informed consent to the new 
payment.180  Therefore, the union’s procedure for collecting fees 
from nonmembers was not carefully tailored to minimize 
impingement on nonmembers’ First Amendment rights.181  The 
Court concluded: 
To respect the limits of the First Amendment, the union 
should have sent out a new notice allowing nonmembers 
to opt in to the special fee rather than requiring them to 
opt out.  Our cases have tolerated a substantial 
impingement on First Amendment rights by allowing 
unions to impose an opt-out requirement at all.  Even if 
this burden can be justified during the collection of 
regular dues on an annual basis, there is no way to justify 
the additional burden of imposing yet another opt-out 
 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. at 2291 (quoting Chi. Teachers Union Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 
U.S. 292, 303 (1986)). 
 179.  Id. at 2291–92. 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  The Court rejected the union’s argument that an increase in dues for 
political purposes in the current year would be offset by a decrease in chargeable 
expenses in the following year.  The later decrease “would not fully recompense 
nonmembers who did not opt out after receiving the regular notice but would 
have opted out if they had been permitted to do so when the special assessment 
was announced.”  Id. at 2292.  Even a full refund “would not undo the violation of 
First Amendment rights,” because “the First Amendment does not permit a union 
to extract a loan from unwilling nonmembers even if the money is later paid back 
in full.”  Id. at 2292–93.  A refund provided after the money had been spent for 
political purposes would be “cold comfort.”  Id. at 2293. 
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requirement to collect special fees whenever the union 
desires.182 
As a practical matter, the Court also took issue with the 
union’s methods of defining and accounting for its expenditures.  
While the union’s statements of expenses that accompany Hudson 
notices are audited, the auditor does not express a legal opinion as 
to which expenses are chargeable and which are not; the auditor’s 
function is limited to “ensur[ing] that the expenditures which the 
union claims it made for certain expenses were actually made for 
those expenses.”183  The union’s view of the scope of its chargeable 
expenses, according to the Court, “is so expansive that it is hard to 
place much reliance on its statistics.”184  If the Court were to accept 
the union’s definition of chargeability, “it would effectively 
eviscerate the limitation on the use of compulsory fees to support 
unions’ controversial political activities.”185 
3. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions 
Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, concurring in the judgment, 
agreed that a second Hudson notice and opportunity to opt out are 
necessary when a public-sector union imposes a special assessment 
to fund its political activity.  However, Sotomayor took the majority 
to task on its decision to institute an opt-in system for political 
expenditures.  The majority, according to Sotomayor, “proceeds, 
quite unnecessarily, to reach significant constitutional issues not 
contained in the questions presented, briefed, or argued,”186 which 
 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id. at 2294 (alteration in original) (quoting Andrews v. Educ. Ass’n of 
Cheshire, 829 F.2d 335, 340 (2d Cir. 1987)). 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id. at 2295. 
 186.  Id. at 2297 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  The petitioners presented the 
following questions:  
1. . . . May a State, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, 
condition employment on the payment of a special union assessment 
intended solely for political purposes—a statewide ballot initiative 
campaign—without first providing a Hudson notice that includes 
information about that assessment and provides an opportunity to opt out of 
supporting those political exactions? 
2. . . . May a State, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, 
condition continued public employment on the payment of agency fees 
for purposes of financing a union’s opposition to public ballot initiatives? 
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 154, at i (emphasis added).  The respondent 
presented the following questions: 
1. If a public employee union has already issued an annual Hudson notice 
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violates the Court’s own rules.187  The question of whether an opt-in 
system for nonchargeable expenses is constitutionally necessary was 
not one that either party raised in its briefs or arguments.188  With 
respect to such a constitutionally significant question, 
[t]he imperative of judicial restraint is at its zenith 
here . . . for “[i]f there is one doctrine more deeply 
rooted than any other in the process of constitutional 
adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions 
of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is 
unavoidable.”189 
Furthermore, the Court’s holding—that “when a public-sector 
union imposes a special assessment or dues increase, the union 
must provide a fresh Hudson notice and may not exact any funds 
from nonmembers without their affirmative consent”190—raised 
more questions than it answered,191 and introduced a great deal of 
 
establishing an objector fee based upon its auditor-verified expenditures 
in the preceding year, must the union, when instituting a temporary 
increase in membership dues that will not change the objector fee rate, 
issue a supplemental notice that predicts how the funds generated by the 
increase will be used, establishes a new objector fee rate solely for the 
increase based upon those predictions, and provides nonmembers with a 
separate opportunity to object to paying the predicted nonchargeable 
portion of the increase?   
2. (a) Can nonmembers of a public employee union pursue in this Court 
a chargeability challenge to the union’s spending to oppose a ballot 
initiative, where they disavowed and never litigated such a claim below, 
where the decision below did not decide such a claim, and where there is 
no evidence that objectors’ fees were spent to support the union’s 
opposition to the initiative?   
(b) If so, is a public employee union’s opposition to a ballot initiative 
that would give a state’s governor the power to abrogate the union’s 
collective bargaining agreements sufficiently related to “contract . . . 
implementation[]” . . . that the costs of that opposition are chargeable to 
all nonmembers?   
Brief for Respondent, supra note 148, at i–ii (first ommission in original) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 187.  See SUP. CT. R. 14.1(a) (“Only the questions set out in the petition, or 
fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court.”). 
 188.  See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 154; Brief for Respondent, supra note 
148. 
 189.  Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2298 (alterations in original) (quoting Clinton v. 
Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 690 n.11 (1997)). 
 190.  Id. at 2296 (majority opinion). 
 191.  Id. at 2298–99 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  Justice Sotomayor asked, 
Must a union undertaking a special assessment or dues increase obtain 
affirmative consent to collect ‘any funds’ or solely to collect funds for 
nonchargeable expenses?  May a nonmember opt not to contribute to a 
special assessment, even if the assessment is levied to fund uncontestably 
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uncertainty in an area of law that had been settled for some time. 
Justice Sotomayor also criticized the majority for backing away 
from longstanding precedent that placed the burden of objecting 
on the dissenting nonmember.192  “To cast serious doubt on 
longstanding precedent is a step we historically take only with the 
greatest caution and reticence.”193  The majority’s decision to step 
away from a long-settled issue, without affording the parties the 
opportunity to brief and argue the issue was “both unfair and 
unwise.”194  “Not content with our task, prescribed by Article III, of 
answering constitutional questions,” Sotomayor concluded, “the 
majority today decides to ask them as well.”195 
Justices Breyer and Kagan dissented, criticizing the majority’s 
departure from Hudson’s framework for “developing 
administratively workable systems that (1) allow unions to pay the 
costs of fulfilling their representational obligations to both 
members and nonmembers alike, while (2) simultaneously 
protecting the nonmembers’ constitutional right not to support 
ideological causes not germane to [the union’s] duties as collective-
bargaining agent.”196 
Focusing on the practical ramifications of the majority’s 
approach, the dissent disapproved of the Court’s willingness to 
depart from Hudson’s framework, upon which unions and 
employers have relied for twenty-five years.197  The dissent conceded 
that the Hudson approach—which bases one year’s chargeable 
expenses on the previous year’s expenditures and can vary 
significantly from year to year—is imperfect.198  Still, such an 
approach “enjoys an offsetting administrative virtue.”199  Because 
the present year’s dues are based upon the prior year’s audited 
 
chargeable activities?  Does the majority’s new rule allow for any 
distinction between nonmembers who had earlier objected to the 
payment of nonchargeable expenses and those who had not?  What 
procedures govern this new world of fee collection? 
Id. 
 192.  Id. at 2299.  Justice Sotomayor specifically criticized the majority for 
casting aside the Court’s “explicit holding” in International Association of Machinists 
v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961) as “nothing but an ‘offhand remark.’”  Knox, 132 S. 
Ct. at 2299. 
 193.  Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2299. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Id. at 2300 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted). 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  Id. at 2301. 
 199.  Id. 
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expenses, nonmembers receive a level of certainty that they would 
not have if the union were required to make predictions about the 
coming year’s expenses instead.200  And while nonmembers will pay 
more in some years and less in others, “what [they] lose on the 
swings they will gain on the roundabouts.”201 
As to the requirement that the union give a fresh Hudson 
notice when it increases dues mid-year, the dissent conceded that 
the opportunity to opt out is a greater concern for nonmembers 
who did not opt out after the first Hudson notice because they will 
not have an opportunity to withhold any amount of the increase.202  
Nevertheless, the dissent maintained, requiring the union to issue a 
new notice is administratively unworkable and not required by the 
Constitution.203  Hudson’s annual notice approach is imperfect, 
“[b]ut for constitutional purposes the critical fact is that annual 
objection is at least one reasonably practical way to permit the 
principled objector to avoid paying for politics with which he 
disagrees.”204 
The dissent also rejected the majority’s position that an opt-in 
system is necessary to protect objecting nonmembers’ First 
Amendment rights.205  The dissent agreed with Justice Sotomayor 
that the majority improperly decided a question that had not been 
presented to the Court,206 but the dissent further explained that an 
opt-in system primarily protects those “who do not feel strongly 
enough about the union’s politics to indicate a choice either 
way.”207  These nonmembers may not care enough to opt in, but 
also would not have opted out.  Thus, the opt-in system has the 
potential to significantly reduce the union’s ability to raise funds 
for political activity while primarily protecting the First 
Amendment rights of nonmembers who don’t care enough to 
assert them.208  As the Court held in Davenport, states may choose to 
 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  Id. at 2304. 
 203.  “[I]nsofar as a new objection permits the new objector to withhold only 
the portion of the fee that will pay for nonchargeable expenses . . . unions, 
arbitrators, and courts will have to determine, on the basis of a prediction, how 
much of the special assessment the new objector can withhold.”  Id. at 2305. 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  Id. at 2306. 
 206.  Id. 
 207.  Id. at 2307. 
 208.  Id. 
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impose an opt-in requirement on their public-sector unions,209 but 
the Supreme Court has never mandated it.  “There is no good 
reason for the Court suddenly to enter the debate” over opt-in 
requirements, Justice Breyer wrote, “much less now to decide that 
the Constitution resolves it.”210 
4. Analysis 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Knox is a breathtaking 
display of judicial activism by the far-right wing of the Court,211 
which calls into question the future of public-sector unionism in 
the United States.  Four features of this decision in particular 
should give advocates for workplace fairness great cause for 
concern. 
First, the Court abandoned fifty years of precedent212 to 
unilaterally impose an opt-in system for mid-year changes to 
political dues and fees, even though neither party asked the Court 
to reach that question, and neither party had an opportunity to 
brief and argue the issue.  The Court dismissed as dicta the 
“explicit holding”213 from Street, that “dissent is not to be 
presumed—it must affirmatively be made known to the union by 
the dissenting employee.”214  Since Street, the Court had continued 
to apply this requirement throughout its subsequent cases,215 a 
principle commonly known as stare decisis, but which the majority, 
in this case, called “a historical accident.”216 
By moving away from long-settled principles of labor law, the 
Court injected a great deal of uncertainty into the law that will 
likely invite future litigation.217  The effect of the Court’s holding 
 
 209.  Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177 (2007). 
 210.  Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2307. 
 211.  A New York Times editorial called the decision “one of the most brazen of 
the Roberts [C]ourt.”  Editorial, The Anti-Union Roberts Court, N.Y. TIMES,                     
June 23, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/opinion/the-anti-union               
-roberts-court.html. 
 212.  See Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961). 
 213.  Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2299 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 214.  Street, 367 U.S. at 774. 
 215.  See Chi. Teachers Union Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986); 
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
 216.  Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2290 (majority opinion). 
 217.  William Gould, Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board from 
1994 to 1998, said, “The Court’s opinion makes clear its displeasure with [sixty] 
years of precedent on the dues issue, which have placed the burden on employees 
who object [to political spending] to opt out . . . .  This decision is an invitation to 
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(“[W]hen a public-sector union imposes a special assessment or 
dues increase, the union must provide a fresh Hudson notice and 
may not exact any funds from nonmembers without their 
affirmative consent”218) is to raise more questions than it settles.  
Does the opt-in procedure apply to every dues increase, or only to 
mid-year increases?  If a nonmember objects for the first time 
following a mid-year increase, how will the chargeable portion be 
calculated?  Will the union have to estimate its coming year’s 
expenses?  How will such estimates and expenses be audited?  Must 
the union issue a refund, or may it collect on an underpayment, if 
its projections later proved to be inaccurate?  Because the Court 
reached questions in its holding that the parties did not brief or 
argue, the parties lost an opportunity to weigh in on how the Court 
should answer these practical administrative questions. 
The Court’s holding in Knox also calls into question the 
viability of Street’s holding, which requires a showing of affirmative 
dissent from nonmembers.  It is not clear whether the Court 
intended to overrule Street, but the Court’s holding in Knox leaves 
the door wide open to impose Knox’s holding on private-sector 
unions as well.  To make dissent the default position would seem to 
upset the balance the Court struck in Street between the right of 
dissenting nonmembers to avoid supporting union speech and the 
right of the majority of the members to speak collectively on 
matters of political importance.  Knox’s holding tips the balance in 
favor of dissenters. 
Second, the Court circumvented the democratic process to 
impose court-made law in an area that has traditionally been left to 
the states.  Congress left the regulation of labor relations with state 
employees to the states.219  States have been free to experiment with 
various labor relations systems and laws, and the Court has 
protected such experimentation.  In Davenport, for example, the 
Court held that a state may pass a law requiring that nonmembers 
 
litigate this issue.”  Cole Stangler, Supreme Court Union Ruling, Knox v. SEIU, Could 
Cut Back Labor’s Political Speech, THE HUFFINGTON POST, (June 25, 2012                 
7:32 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/25/supreme-court-unions        
-knox-v-seiu_n_1625659.html. 
 218.  Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2296. 
 219.  See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006); see also Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 
551 U.S. 177, 186 (2007) (“[O]ur repeated affirmation that courts have an 
obligation to interfere with a union’s statutory entitlement no more than is 
necessary to vindicate the rights of nonmembers does not imply that legislatures 
(or voters) themselves cannot limit the scope of that entitlement.”). 
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be required to opt in to, rather than permitted to opt out of, dues 
levied for political purposes.220  Now, however, the Court, on its 
own initiative, converted that permissive regulation to a mandatory 
one for all states.  This is especially troubling in light of the fact 
that Proposition 75, which would have required unions to obtain 
members’ affirmative consent before charging them dues and fees 
to be used for political purposes, was defeated by California 
voters.221  Thus, the Supreme Court imposed a regime that voters 
rejected. 
Furthermore, California law also permits some political 
expenditures to be counted as chargeable expenses.222  In that state, 
chargeable expenses may include “the costs of support of lobbying 
activities designed to foster policy goals and collective negotiations 
and contract administration, or to secure for the employees 
represented advantages in wages, hours, and other conditions of 
employment in addition to those secured through meeting and 
conferring with the state employer.”223  California’s law appears to 
recognize that, in order to be effective at the bargaining table, 
unions of public-sector workers must also engage in political 
activity to persuade lawmakers to support the union’s negotiating 
positions.  Without engaging in some political activity, unions of 
public workers cannot effectively represent the members’ best 
interests at the bargaining table.224  Not only does the Court’s 
holding in Knox call into question the viability of California’s law 
without affording the state an opportunity to defend it, it also 
ignores the benefit of some political activity to both members and 
nonmembers in the collective bargaining process.  This is 
particularly troubling because unions have a duty to represent the 
 
 220.  Davenport, 551 U.S. at 178. 
 221.  See Proposition 75, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF CAL. EDUC. FUND (Jan. 28, 
2006, 2:49 PM), http://www.smartvoter.org/2005/11/08/ca/state/prop/75/. 
 222.  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3515.8 (West 2010). 
 223.  Id. 
 224.  See Rafael Gely, Ramona L. Paetzold & Leonard Bierman, Educating the 
United States Supreme Court at Summers’ School: A Lesson on the “Special Character of the 
Animal,” 14 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 93, 117 (2010) (“[U]nion representation in 
the public sector is based on the understanding that the collective bargaining 
process represents only one component of the relationship between the public 
employee and the public employer. . . .  In the public sector . . . collective 
bargaining duties related to conditions of employment cannot readily be seen as 
distinct from a union’s political activities. . . .  [P]ublic policies that make it harder 
for public sector unions to engage in political activities also, in turn, make it 
harder for them to fulfill the full panoply of their bargaining responsibilities.”). 
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interests of members and nonmembers alike.  Limiting the unions’ 
ability to engage with the decision makers on the other side of the 
bargaining table hamstrings the unions in the fulfillment of that 
duty. 
Third, the Court hinted unsubtly that a judicially-created 
nationwide “right-to-work” scheme—at least for public-sector 
unions, if not all unions—may be on its agenda.225  The Court 
noted that union dues constitute a “significant impingement”226 on 
First Amendment rights, and that while “[o]ur cases to date have 
tolerated this ‘impingement’ . . . we do not revisit today whether 
the Court’s former cases have given adequate recognition to the 
critical First Amendment rights at stake”227—foreboding dicta that 
suggests that the Court is inviting further challenges to laws that 
allow unions to collect agency fees from nonmembers.  Indeed, the 
Knox decision “all but begs right-wing advocacy groups and public 
employers to use [the Court’s] emerging First-Amendment 
jurisprudence to take down public-employee unions and in essence 
find a Southern-style ‘right-to-work’ law in the Constitution.”228 
The Court has even conveniently foreshadowed the logical 
path it could take in order to arrive at its answer to the “right-to-
work” question.  First, it blurs the critical distinction between dues 
used for politics and dues used for collective bargaining, a 
distinction the Court itself drew in Abood.229  Dues collected for any 
purpose, according to the Court in Knox, constitute a form of 
compelled speech and represent “a significant impingement on 
First Amendment rights.”230  Because a public-sector union bargains 
collectively with politically accountable officials, that bargaining 
itself has “powerful political and civic consequences.”231  In essence, 
the Court equated public-sector collective bargaining with political 
activity simply because the employer is a governmental entity.  
Then, from this position, it is a very short leap to requiring that all 
 
 225.  The National Labor Relations Act permits states to enact “right-to-work” 
laws covering the private-sector workforce.  See 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (2006).  Because 
states regulate their own public-sector labor relations, each state chooses whether 
its public-employment system will be a “right-to-work” system or an agency-shop 
system. 
 226.  Knox v. Serv. Emp. Int’l Union Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2289 (2012). 
 227.  Id. 
 228.  Garrett Epps, The Court’s Scott Walker Moment, AM. PROSPECT (June 21, 
2012), http://prospect.org/article/court%E2%80%99s-scott-walker-moment.  
 229.  Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 229–31 (1977). 
 230.  Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2289. 
 231.  Id. 
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public-sector employment be “right-to-work.”232  After all, if all 
public-sector collective bargaining is political, and unions may not 
compel nonmembers to pay dues for political purposes, then 
unions may not compel nonmembers to pay any dues at all.  This is 
the essence of the “right-to-work” model: nonmembers cannot be 
compelled to pay any dues, even to support the union’s collective 
bargaining efforts, which benefit all the employees covered by the 
contract. 
Finally, the Court cited in passing,233 but largely ignored, the 
most troublesome precedent with which it should have grappled: 
Citizens United.234  In fact, the disconnect between Citizens United and 
Knox and its predecessors may be the most disturbing feature of 
this case.  While the key holding in Citizens United—that the First 
Amendment does not permit political speech restrictions based on 
the speaker’s identity235—purports to place unions and 
corporations on equal footing insofar as political spending is 
concerned, Knox undermines that supposed equality in three key 
ways. 
First, while Citizens United rejected onerous administrative 
requirements for corporate speakers, Knox further entrenches such 
requirements for unions.  The Court in Citizens United found that 
forcing corporations to conduct their political speech through 
 
 232.  Acknowledging the inherently political nature of public-sector collective 
bargaining does not compel the conclusion that unionization is inappropriate in 
the public sector, which seems to be the direction in which the Court is headed.  
Indeed, Professor Summers reaches the opposite conclusion when examining the 
special character of public-sector collective bargaining, which he calls a “properly 
and inevitably political” act.  Summers, Bargaining in the Government’s Business, 
supra note 31, at 266.  Robust unions are necessary to protect the interests of 
public workers, he argues; “one of the principal justifications for public-employee 
bargaining is that most public employees need this special process to give them an 
ability to counteract the overriding political strength of other voters who 
constantly press for lower taxes and increased services.”  Summers, Problems of 
Governmental Decisionmaking, supra note 31, at 675.  “Right-to-work” schemes 
weaken unions and make it more difficult for them to bargain effectively on behalf 
of their members.  See generally Michael M. Oswalt, The Grand Bargain: Revitalizing 
Labor Through NLRA Reform and Radical Workplace Relations, 57 DUKE L.J. 691 
(2007). 
 233.  “Public-sector unions have the right under the First Amendment to 
express their views on political and social issues without government interference.”  
Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2295 (citing Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. 
Ct. 876 (2010)).  This is the only reference to Citizens United in the Court’s 
opinion. 
 234.  Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876. 
 235.  Id. at 903. 
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political action committees (“PACs”), with all the attendant 
reporting and recordkeeping requirements, represented a 
“burdensome alternative[]” to direct speech and was impermissible 
under the First Amendment.236  Analogously, then, “it should be 
true that unions, as associations, have significant First Amendment 
interests themselves, and that imposing excessive procedural or 
compliance burdens on union speech can amount to a First 
Amendment violation.”237  For unions, however, the recordkeeping 
and reporting requirements under Hudson and other statutory 
provisions are even more burdensome than those demanded of 
PACs.238  Knox not only left those administrative burdens in place 
for unions, it increased them by requiring unions to identify which 
nonmembers wish to opt in to support a union’s political 
program.239  The Court in Knox did not acknowledge this lopsided 
scheme, much less attempt to justify it.240 
Second, as the Court noted in Citizens United, “[s]peech 
restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often 
simply a means to control content.”241  Making it easier for 
corporations to spend money on political speech, while making it 
harder for unions to do the same, will create the predictable result 
of over-representing corporate interests in the public discourse.242  
 
 236.  Id. at 897. 
 237.  Charlotte Garden, Citizens, United and Citizens United: The Future of Labor 
Speech Rights?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 41 (2011). 
 238.  See id., at 14 (“[U]nions’ uses of dues and fees for political purposes are 
encumbered even beyond [campaign finance law’s] independent expenditure 
provision.  For example, unions are not permitted to use for political purposes 
dues and fees submitted by members who object to such use, and they must 
publicly disclose many of their expenditures and receipts pursuant to the Labor 
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act.  This means that even if unions are 
excused from the segregation and reporting requirements that election law 
imposes, they must nonetheless carefully track their spending and ensure that only 
authorized funds go toward political activities.”) (citations omitted)).  These opt-
out requirements apply to both private-sector and public-sector workers.  
Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), created opt-out 
requirements for private-sector unions substantially similar to Hudson’s 
requirements for public-sector workers. 
 239.  Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2293 (2012). 
 240.  See Garden, supra note 237, at 43–44 (“At minimum, before imposing 
requirements designed to protect objectors in public . . . employment, courts 
should ensure that the requirements are narrowly tailored and that they will be, 
on balance, sufficiently effective to justify the burden on unions’ political 
speech.”). 
 241.  Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899. 
 242.  Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights After 
Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800, 861–62 (2012). 
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By erecting greater roadblocks to unions’ political speech, Knox 
increases the opportunities for corporate voices to drown out 
workers’ voices in the marketplace of ideas.  This content-based 
disparity makes this distinction constitutionally suspect.243 
Third, while Knox mandated an opt-in scheme for objecting 
nonmembers in public-sector unions, corporate shareholders who 
object to their companies’ political spending under Citizens United 
are not afforded a similar right to opt out of those expenditures.244  
Thus, corporations may spend freely the proportionate shares of 
the residual claimants’ interests in the corporation without their 
consent,245 but public-sector unions must now ask permission of 
every member before collecting dues money for political speech.246  
The problem with this asymmetry between shareholder rights and 
objecting nonmember rights is that it “provide[s] corporations a 
legally constructed advantage over unions when it comes to 
political spending,”247 which is inconsistent with federal campaign 
finance law’s insistence that unions and corporations be put “on 
exactly the same basis, insofar as their financial activities are 
concerned.”248  The Court’s admonition in Knox that “[t]he general 
rule—individuals should not be compelled to subsidize private 
groups or private speech—should prevail”249 seems only to apply to 
dissenting nonmembers and not to dissenting shareholders. 
In sum, Knox is in many ways incompatible with Citizens United, 
a disconnect that the Court functionally ignored.250  Although the 
Knox Court cited Citizens United for the proposition that “[p]ublic-
sector unions have the right under the First Amendment to express 
their views on political and social issues without government 
interference,” this obscures the complicated and thorny First 
Amendment issues that both cases raise.251 
 
 243.  Id. at 862. 
 244.  For a thorough examination of the problems with the asymmetry 
between shareholders’ rights and objecting nonmembers’ rights, see id. 
 245.  Id. at 825. 
 246.  Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2293 (2012). 
 247.  Sachs, supra note 242, at 803. 
 248.  Id. (quoting United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 579 (1957)). 
 249.  Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2295. 
 250.  See generally Jeremy G. Mallory, Still Other People’s Money: Reconciling 
Citizens United with Abood and Beck, 47 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 32 (2010) (arguing that 
“no principled distinction exists that would prevent the cross-application” of the 
union dues precedents in the corporate speech context). 
 251.  Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2295 (citing Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Knox seems to 
signal open season on workers and their unions, workers and voters 
are fighting back.  Indeed, popular support for pro-union laws 
remains strong, and where anti-union measures have been put 
directly to voters, those measures have frequently been rejected.  In 
California, for instance, where the Knox case originated, voters 
recently defeated Proposition 32, a measure that, like the Idaho law 
at issue in Ysursa, would have barred both public- and private-sector 
unions from collecting dues for political purposes through 
employee payroll deductions.252 
Voters in Ohio also soundly defeated SB 5, a Wisconsin-style 
measure pushed by Governor John Kasich that would have 
curtailed public employees’ collective-bargaining rights, eliminated 
the right to strike, and scrapped binding arbitration of labor-
management disputes.253  By a margin of 61–39%, voters in that 
state turned back the anti-union overreaching by Governor 
Kasich;254 because of his support of SB 5, the Governor’s approval 
ratings sank to 38% in the months leading up to the election.255 
Even in Michigan, where the Republican-dominated lame-
duck legislature and Republican governor hastily pushed through a 
“right-to-work” law before the end of the 2012 term, only 41 
percent of Michiganders support right-to-work legislation.256  With 
the election of several more Democrats to the state legislature, 
 
 252.  Proposition 32, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF CAL. EDUC. FUND (Dec. 17, 
2012, 1:48 PM), http://www.smartvoter.org/2012/11/06/ca/state/prop/32/; see 
also Proposition 32: Prohibits Political Contributions by Payroll Deduction, CAL. LEGIS. 
ANALYST’S OFF. (July 18, 2012), http://lao.ca.gov/ballot/2012/32_11_2012.pdf.  
The proposition would also have banned payroll deductions for political 
expenditures by corporations, but according to the Legislative Analyst’s Office, 
“[o]ther than unions, relatively few organizations currently use payroll deductions 
to finance political spending in California.”  Id. at 3.  That provision, then, would 
have been essentially meaningless. 
 253.  Amanda Terkel & John Celock, Ohio Issue 2: Controversial Anti-Union Law 
Defeated by Voters, HUFFINGTON POST, (Nov. 9, 2011, 12:38 PM), http://www 
.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/08/ohio-issue-2-_n_1083100.html. 
 254.  Id. 
 255.  Joe Vardon, Kasich Can Count Big Wins, SB 5 Loss in First Year, COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH, Dec. 18, 2011, http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2011 
/12/18/kasich-can-count-big-wins-sb-5-loss-in-first-year.html. 
 256.  Tom Jensen, Snyder’s Popularity Plummets, PUB. POL’Y POLLING                         
(Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.publicpolicypolling.com/main/2012/12/snyders               
-popularity-plummets.html. 
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right-to-work legislation would have failed in the next session.257  
And with such low support among the public, it likely would have 
been defeated if put to a popular vote.  Perhaps for that reason, 
supporters of the legislation tied the right-to-work language to an 
appropriations bill, eliminating the possibility that it could be 
overturned by referendum.258  Workers in the cradle of the 
American labor movement, however, are not rolling over.  One 
lawsuit has already been filed to challenge the law, and labor is 
mulling its other options, including political as well as legal 
strategies.259 
As workers beat back anti-union initiatives from right-wing 
lawmakers at the state level, there is also hope at the federal level.  
In the next four years, President Obama may have the opportunity 
to replace more than one member of the Supreme Court;260 a 
moderate majority could help to stem the tide of anti-union 
decisions coming out of the Court.  For public-sector workers in 
particular, the stakes have never been higher. 
 
 
 257.  Josh Hicks, Did Michigan Lawmakers Ram Through ‘Right to Work’ Laws?, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact                           
-checker/post/did-michigan-lawmakers-ram-through-right-to-work-laws/2012/12 
/19/a87d8e60-47c9-11e2-b6f0-e851e741d196_blog.html. 
 258.  Chad Livengood & Karen Bouffard, Snyder Makes Michigan 24th Right-to-
Work State, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 11, 2012, http://www.detroitnews.com/article 
/20121211/POLITICS02/212110393.  
 259.  Amanda Terkel, Right to Work in Michigan: Labor’s Options for Repeal, 
HUFFINGTON POST, (Dec. 11, 2012, 4:13 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/2012/12/11/right-to-work-michigan_n_2277178.html; see also Jim Lynch, 
Lawsuits Expected over Right to Work, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 20, 2012, http:// 
www.detroitnews.com/article/20121220/POLITICS02/212200365. 
 260.  Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Future of an Aging Court Raises Stakes of Presidential 
Vote, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/28/us 
/presidential-election-could-reshape-an-aging-supreme-court.html.  There are now 
four justices—Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsberg, and Breyer—over the age of 74.  
Id.  The average retirement age for Supreme Court justices is 78.7.  Id. 
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